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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Morris argued that the district court had jurisdiction to
"commute" his sentence and place him on probation pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
33(d) and Idaho Code Section 19-2601 (4). He also argued that the district court abused
its discretion when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, I.C.R. 35) motion
requesting leniency and when it concluded it would have denied his I.C.R. 33(d) motion
on the merits. This brief is necessary to reply to the State's argument that a district
court does not have the authority to commute a sentence after the sentence has been
imposed and executed.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
After the State filed its Respondent's Brief, Mr. Morris filed a pro se Affidavit of
Genuine Issue of Material Fact, which is being withdrawn from this Court's
consideration.
Otherwise, the statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Morris's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES

1

1)

Did the district court have jurisdiction to "commute" Mr. Morris' sentence pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(d) and Idaho Code Section 19-2601 (4)? 1

2)

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Morris's request for
probation, made pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35?

3)

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Morris' Idaho
Criminal Rule 33(d) motion on its merits?

This is the only issue which will be addressed in this brief.
2

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Had Jurisdiction To "Commute" Mr. Morris' Sentence Pursuant To
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(d) And Idaho Code Section 19-2601(4)

A.

Introduction
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Morris argued that, pursuant to, I.C.R. 33(d) and

I.C. § 19-2601(4), the district court had jurisdiction for one year to suspend his sentence
and place him on probation. At the time, he used the term "commute" as a shorthand
way of describing the action he was requesting the district court to perform.

In

retrospect, "commute" was a poor choice of words, as it has a specific meaning under
LC. § 19-2601(1). 2 Nevertheless, the substance of his argument remains sound. The
first sentence of I.C. § 19-2601 (4) provides the district court up to one year after the
entry of judgment to suspend the defendant's sentence and place him on probation.

In

other words, I.C. § 19-2601 (4) extends the district court's jurisdiction for one year.

B.

The District Court Had Jurisdiction To "Commute" Mr. Morris' Sentence Pursuant
To Idaho Criminal Rule 33(d) And Idaho Code Section 19-2601 (4)
The State argues that the district court correctly concluded that it did not have

jurisdiction to consider Mr. Morris' Rule 33(d) motion. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.) In
support of this assertion, it relies on State v. Starry, 130 Idaho 834 (1997), the facts of
which the State asserts are analogous to Mr. Morris' case.
Contrary to the State's assertion, Starry is distinguishable.

(Respondent's Brief, p.10.)
In Starry, the defendant

pleaded guilty to two counts of kidnapping. Id. at 835. Eighteen years later, Mr. Starry

2

Under I.C. § 19-2601 (1 ), "commutation" entails imposing sentence and placing the
defendant in county jail instead of prison.
3

"filed a pro se self-styled 'petition to commute sentence' in the district court citing
I.C. §§ 19-2601 and 19-2523." Id. (original emphasis). The district court denied the
motion without a hearing and Mr. Starry appealed. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's decision based on its conclusion that the district court had no
authority to commute a sentence once it has been imposed and executed, as that
authority rests with Idaho's executive branch.

Id.

The Court also held that the

defendant's motion was, in substance, an untimely I.C.R. 35 motion. Id. This case is
distinguishable from Starry because Mr. Morris filed his I.C.R. 33(d) motion within one
year of the judgment of conviction.
This distinction is relevant because Mr. Morris is arguing that I.C. § 19-2601 (4)
extends the district court's jurisdiction to suspend a sentence for one year after the
issuance of the judgment of conviction. The defendant in Starry relied on no rule to
extend the district court's jurisdiction over his case as he filed it eighteen years after the
entrance of the judgment of conviction. Since there was no rule to extend the district
court's jurisdiction for eighteen years, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the district
court. For that reason, Starry is inapposite when compared to the facts of this case.
Additionally, the Starry opinion is inapposite because it neither addressed the
specific language of I.C. § 19-2601 (4) nor the argument being advanced by Mr. Morris.
The Starry opinion did not recite the specific arguments proffered by Mr. Starry, so there
is no way of knowing if the Starry Court was addressing the specific issues advanced by
Mr. Morris. Moreover, it really would not matter because Mr. Starry filed his motion to
commute his sentence eighteen years after the entry of judgment, and as stated above,

4

that late filing would prevent Mr. Starry prevailing under the theory advanced by
Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris' reliance on the first sentence of I.C. § 19-2601 (4) is in harmony with
the other commonly accepted methods utilized to extend a district court's jurisdiction.
For example, a district court can retain jurisdiction for a year, and at the end of that year
decide whether to suspend a defendant's sentence and place the defendant on
probation. In the event probation is ordered at the time of sentencing, or after a period
of retained jurisdiction, the district court's jurisdiction can extend for years if the
defendant is successful on probation.

A district court's power to reduce a sentence

pursuant to a timely I.C.R. 35 motion can extend for a period of time longer than a year,
in the event there is a justification for the delay. State v. Fisch, 142 Idaho 781 (Ct App.
2006).
In sum, Starry is distinguishable because the motion to commute in that case
was filed eighteen years after the sentence was imposed and executed, and because
Mr. Starry did not rely on either a statute or rule which extended the district court's
jurisdiction over his case. Conversely, Mr. Morris filed his I.C.R. 33(d) motion within a
year of the entry of judgment and the district court's jurisdiction over this case was
extended by I.C. § 19-2601 (4). Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to rule on
the merits of Mr. Morris' I.C.R. 33(d) motion to suspend his sentence.

5

CONCLUSION
Mr. Morris respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter to the district
court with instructions to review the merits of Mr. Morris' !.C.R. 33(d) motion.
Alternatively, Mr. Morris respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with
instructions to place Mr. Morris on probation.

Alternatively, Mr. Morris respectfully

requests that this Court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence.
DATED this 19th day of October, 2012.

SHAWN
WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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